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The evolution of strongly‑held group 
identities through agent‑based 
cooperation
Roger M. Whitaker1,2*, Gualtiero B. Colombo1,2 & Yarrow Dunham3
Identity fusion represents a strongly‑held personal identity that significantly overlaps with that of 
a group, and is the current best explanation as to why individuals become empowered to act with 
extreme self‑sacrifice for a group of non‑kin. This is widely seen and documented, yet how identity 
fusion is promoted by evolution is not well‑understood, being seemingly counter to the selfish pursuit 
of survival. In this paper we extend agent‑based modelling to explore how and why identity fusion 
can establish itself in an unrelated population with no previous shared experiences. Using indirect 
reciprocity to provide a framework for agent interaction, we enable agents to express their identity 
fusion towards a group, and observe the effects of potential behaviours that are incentivised by 
a heightened fusion level. These build on the social psychology literature and involve heightened 
sensitivity of fused individuals to perceived hypocritical group support from others. We find that 
simple self‑referential judgement and ignorance of perceived hypocrites is sufficient to promote 
identity fusion and this is easily triggered by a sub‑group of the population. Interestingly the self‑
referential judgement that we impose is an individual‑level behaviour with no direct collective benefit 
shared by the population. The study provides clues, beyond qualitative and observational studies, 
as to how hypocrisy may have established itself to reinforce the collective benefit of a fused group 
identity. It also provides an alternative perspective on the controversial proposition of group selection 
‑ showing how fluidity between an individual’s reputation and that of a group may function and 
influence selection as a consequence of identity fusion.
The role of strongly-held identities in motivating human behaviour, particularly in respect of groups, has gained 
widespread  interest1. In particular, identity  fusion2 has made significant progress in characterising the causal 
mechanisms that lead individuals to act with extremist pro-group actions that appear self-less. Unlike preced-
ing theories on social identity (e.g.,3,4), identity fusion postulates that individuals retain a personal identity that 
has a porous boundary with a group identity, meaning that the personal and group identity become integrated, 
rather than a dominant single identity fluctuating (i.e., group verses personal identity). Critically, through iden-
tity fusion, individuals do not become depersonalised, and instead, both individual and group identities persist, 
with characteristics of group identity being evident in the individual’s sense of self. Consequently when identity 
fusion is strong, behaviours that occur in support of one’s identity are also pro-group. The implications of this 
mechanism are significant since a group can benefit from the acts of an individual while that individual remains 
self-focused. This may promote positive survival benefits for a group, but it can also support extremism, through 
so-called “devoted actors”5–11, defined as individuals fused with a group, with which they share a sacred value. 
These individuals become fully aligned with all-consuming group beliefs that motivate extreme behaviour, to 
the extent that actors disassociate themselves from any consideration of personal risk and costly sacrifice. Fur-
thermore, identity fusion predicts not only extreme self-sacrifice with a group, but also for an ideology, another 
individual, or even other  entities1.
Described as a visceral feeling of oneness with the  group2, identity fusion has been developed from extensive 
empirical observations that bring together principles of personal  agency12, identity  synergy13,14, the saliency of 
relational  ties15 and  irrevocability16, resulting in measures of identity  fusion12 that assess the permeability of an 
individual’s personal and social self, including the development of a verbal  scale17. This has enabled wide-ranging 
OPEN
1School of Computer Science and Informatics, Cardiff University, 5 The Parade, Roath, Cardiff CF24 3AA, 
UK. 2Crime and Security Research Institute, Cardiff University, Friary House, Greyfriars Rd, Cardiff CF10 3AE, 




Scientific Reports |        (2021) 11:12071  | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-021-91333-w
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
insights to be established, helping to explain diverse pro-group behaviours such as  loyalty5,18,  altruism19, self-
sacrifice20, extreme  cooperation21 and  nationalism22.
In contrast to these empirical breakthroughs, relatively little attention has addressed the evolutionary ori-
gins of strongly-held group identities such as identity  fusion9,21. This can be explored through an experimental 
approach using agent-based modelling, which is a long standing, valuable and potentially underused method 
in social  psychology23. In particular, agent-based modelling has predominantly been used to model the fast 
evolution of minimal groups (e.g.,24–28), where elegantly simple assumptions on agent-based interaction result in 
remarkable group-level coordination. However, agent-based modelling has had limited application in exploring 
strongly-held  identities21, which are inherently more complex to model because of the necessary recourse to 
underlying qualitative  theory1. In this paper we present a first approach to exploring how and why might iden-
tity fusion establish itself in an unrelated population with no previous shared experiences. The conditions under 
which self-sacrifice becomes incentivised has received greater attention with existing literature providing useful 
clues in support of the hypothesis that pro-group sacrifices may be a by-product of one or more basic survival 
 mechanisms2. This builds on inclusive  fitness29,30 as a means for individuals to promote the survival of one’s 
genes through support for those with whom they are shared, with evidence of correlation between self-sacrificial 
behaviour and genetic relatedness across a wide range of  species31–35. However inclusive fitness alone is insuf-
ficient to explain how such behaviour may become embedded in unrelated individuals. Research on human kin 
 detection36 further indicates that small group interactions may have co-evolved as a proxy for genetic relatedness, 
for example through perinatal associations, which implicitly support inclusive fitness by promoting the groups 
in which they evolve.
However, identity fusion is prevalent beyond this context, in large unrelated groups rather than small tribal 
groups, where individuals do not a-priori interact (i.e., so-called extended fusion). Swann et al2 comment that a 
form of “shared essence”37 may have emerged where biological behaviours have transferred to the social world, 
contributing to the visceral feeling that binds an individual to the group, based on observations of natural human 
tendencies to conceptualise the world based on biological survival mechanisms (e.g.,38–41). These observations 
point to the important role that evolution has likely played in explaining identity fusion, however the possible 
mechanisms that are responsible for its promotion are open to further  consideration2. In particular, beyond kin-
ship, have particular mechanisms evolved that allow identity fusion to be incentivised and establish itself?
Agent based modelling requires a framework for interaction between agents, and we explore identity fusion 
using indirect  reciprocity42–46. This is a fundamental form of ‘one-shot’ interaction and across all species only 
humans fully engage with indirect  reciprocity47,48, which is thought to have established itself through the man-
agement and assessment of an agent’s  reputation49. As a first model for the evolution of strongly-held identities 
across a population with no a-priori relationships or shared experiences, we adopt indirect reciprocity for two 
main reasons. Firstly, it presents an opportunity to extend a simplistic approach to modelling identity, since 
the widespread convention for indirect reciprocity is to assume that all agents have a unique identity with no 
component being influenced or shared with  others42–44,50–52. Secondly, significant progress has been made based 
on this assumption, providing a baseline for  comparison53. We make progress noting that the composition of an 
agent’s identity determines how its reputation is derived and subsequently used by others in decision-making for 
potential one-shot cooperation. This approach is aligned to the particular context of indirect reciprocity where 
reputation is an important characteristic. However, we note that alternative attributes beyond an agent’s source 
of reputation could be used to facilitate identity.
Our agent based model involves six steps as indicated below, based on the parameters presented in Table 1. 
Steps (1)− (4) represent an agent-based model of cooperation, with the respective components being well-
studied in their own right and (mostly) not derived from identity fusion theory. Identity fusion comes into play 
mainly through step 1 (agents expressing the extent to which they are fused with the group identity), in step 5 
(representing a further proxy for personal reputation, allowing in-group assessment between fused agents) and 
step 6 (behavioural responses for fused agents in light of hypocrisy).
Step (1) - Identity and reputation. Each agent j expresses the extent of its identity fusion fj towards a group G, 
where 0 ≤ fj ≤ 1 , and fj is subject to evolution. We follow the identity fusion assessment  approach54 developed 
for human subjects to express an overlap between their personal identity and a group identity on a pictorial basis 
through a Venn diagram. The extent that a human subject intersects a circle representing their personal identity 
with a circle representing the group G’s identity has been shown to strongly correlate with the individual’s level of 
identity fusion fj towards G17. This approach presents a region of j’s personal identity circle that does not overlap 
with the group G, representing 1− fj of j’s personal identity circle. Through this model, a fused human partici-
pant j expresses 1− fj of their personal identity as being independent of G, and fj of their identity as intersecting 
with G’s identity. We adopt this simple conceptual representation, as used to assess human  subjects17,54, as a first 
proxy for an agent’s reputation. That is, when fi > 0 then we assume agent i views j’s integrated reputation as 
approximated by:
where rj is the personal reputation that is unique to j and a consequence of its actions, while rG represents the 
group reputation which is shared with those having non-zero fusion. When fi = 0 then i views j’s reputation rj 
independent from j’s identity fusion towards G, irrespective of j’s fusion level, specifically:
Equation (2) represents a conservative assumption with respect to identity fusion, ensuring that when i is 
unfused (i.e., fi = 0 ), interactions default to a base  model53 involving only individual isolated reputations. It 
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also aligns with i not needing to value G’s reputation when it is not a member (we note that if Equation (2) is 
removed and all agents adopt Eq. (1), similar results are obtained, but with fusion evolving slightly more strongly 
in particular scenarios).
When viewed in isolation, Eq. (1) appears to diminish the importance of agent j’s personal reputation as 
j’s fusion fj increases. However, it is important to note that Eq. (1) does not function in isolation. Specifically, 
as the observing agent i’s fusion level increases, a further measure of agent j’s personal standing relative to G 
is increasingly applied (see step (5) and ctrj ). Here ctrj represents a personal reputation measure of j’s standing 
with respect to the group, ensuring that j’s personal identity remains salient even when j is highly fused. In 
other words, j’s personal identity is not substituted for the group identity as fusion increases, which is defining 
characteristic of identity fusion.
Step (2) - Agent interaction. Pairs of agents, say i and j, are repeatedly selected at random to play the donation 
game, a generalisation of the mutual aid  game83, where agents choose whether or not to donate at cost c to a 
recipient who gains benefit b > c > 0 , without any guarantee of future reciprocation. If i decides to donate to j 
then i incurs a cost c while the recipient j receives a greater benefit b, where b > c > 0 . Accrued benefits and costs 
result in an agent’s payoff. i’s donation decision is based on simple self-comparison53 of its reputation ri with rj . 
Action rules held by each agent, denoted by the binary vector (si , ui , di) , govern whether or not donations take 
place, based on similarity ( si ), upward comparison ( ui ) or downward comparison ( di ) of j’s reputation rj relative 
to ri . (si , ui , di) represents i’s donation strategy which is subject to evolution, with (1, 1, 0) known to dominate 
and sustain cooperation in the absence of identity  fusion53.
It is often the case that homophily can influence interactions. This is widely seen in  nature27 and can invoke 
in-group  effects71. Here we model this using variable Si (distinct from si ) which governs the probability that agent i 
randomly selects an interaction partner j from its so-called in-group, which is defined as the subset of agents hav-
ing at least the same level of fusion as i (i.e., at least fi in common). Alternatively agent i randomly selects j from 
the whole population of agents with probability 1− Si . This models fusion as a point for homophilic attraction 
and provides an in-group aligned to common pro-group  identities12. We consider both the effects of exogenous 
fixed values for Si , as well as considering personal fusion supporting a hypothetical pro-group disposition to 
interact with fused others (e.g., Si = fi).
Step (3) - Updating reputation. The donation decision that i makes in respect of j potentially results in an 
update to the sources of i’s reputation (possibly ri , rG or both) based on assessment rules. These represent the 
social  norms84–86 that govern whether donation behaviour should be rewarded or penalised, and reflect a form of 
 morality87. While many alternative assessment rules have been  considered42,88–92, we apply  standing88,93,94 which 
avoids penalising agent i for a lack of donation to those viewed as more limited cooperators. We use integer steps 
between -5 and +5 for reputations ri and rG . Specifically, if i donates to j then both ri and rG are incremented. If i 
defects on j and j is at least as reputable as i ( rj ≥ ri ) then both ri and rG are decremented. If i defects on j and j is 
less reputable than i ( rj < ri ) both ri and rG remain unchanged. This assumes that i is fused ( fi > 0 ) and there-
fore i’s reputation is dependent on both ri and rG . When fi = 0 the above updating rules are only applied to ri.
Step (4) - Selection and reproduction. After m interactions between agents, the end of a single generation is 
reached and selection is modelled. Payoff, as a consequence of making and receiving donations gives a basis for 
fitness (see step (2)), where agents update their future strategy based on copying the action rules and fusion level 
of another agent with probability proportional to its relative fitness across the population. This roulette wheel 
approach follows the long standing basis for asexual  reproduction95 and represents a form of social learning 
Table 1.  Key parameters of the model for an agent i.
Parameter(s) Description Role in model Subject to natural selection
ui , di , si
Rules for i’s donation based on self-comparison of potential 
recipient j’s reputation rj with ri Governs i’s donation behaviour Yes
fi Identity fusion level for agent i The extent to which i derives its personal identity from group G Yes
rj
Donor i’s view of agent j’s reputation.
When fi = 0 , rj = rj.
When fi > 0 , rj = (1− fj)rj + fjrG.
Reputation incorporating j’s representation of identity and the 
extent of its fusion with group G No
ri Personal reputation for an agent i
Personal identity for agent i which accrues as a consequence of 
i’s actions No
rG Group reputation
Group identity that is acquired by agents through their identity 
fusion towards G No
ctri
An additional personal reputation for fused agents capturing 
their support for group G
Basis for a fused agent to detect hypocrisy, given the fusion level 








Number of donation actions taken by agent i that respectively: 
contribute to group G’s reputation; leave group G’s reputation 
unchanged; reduce group G’s reputation
Definition of contribution level ctri No
Si
Probability that i plays the donation game with a randomly 
chosen member of the in-group.
Si fixed exogenously or Si = fi
Governs how well-mixed the interactions are between agents in 
different groups No
p Probability that a fused agent i checks for hypocrisy in the potential recipient j Allows fusion to correlate with vicarious hypocrisy, with p = fi No
T Minimum threshold on an agent’s fusion level before considera-tion of ostracism is invoked
Allows assessment of whether just highly fused agents can 
invoke fusion in the wider population No
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commonly applied in the evolution of indirect  reciprocity42,44,96,97. Payoff and all reputation variables are set to 
zero in preparation for the next generation to commence.
Step (5) - Personal identity remains salient for fused agents. Under identity fusion, it is not to be expected 
that strongly fused individuals solely derive their identity and reputation from the group’s identity, and personal 
identity remains highly salient. Because fused individuals see themselves and other group members through 
an individualising lens, they take into account their personal standing and that of other group members when 
they consider each other’s positioning. Therefore we assume fused agents undertake further assessment between 
themselves based on their personal contribution ( ctri ) towards the group. This represents an additional form of 
personal reputation for fused agents specifically aligned to their in-group behaviour.
Note that fused agents have a personal incentive to support pro-group behaviour and the group’s competitive 
 advantage82 due to their identity being drawn in part from the group. There are many ways in which awareness of 
perceived inconsistent behaviour of other group members could present itself to an agent and invoke a response 
through extended  fusion2,72. Based on the fundamental role of social  comparison55,56 in group processes, which 
enables group members to navigate and understand their positioning and social  context98,99, we assume a simple 
(self-referential) approach, based on detecting inconsistency in others personal behaviour as compared to oneself. 
This aligns with experiencing vicarious  hypocrisy74,100. It models the potential for a fused agent to experience 
cognitive  dissonance76,78,79 due to the perceived hypocritical personal  identity77 of agents who are connected 
through co-dependency on fusion with G.
We use an additional form of personal reputation ( ctri ) through which fused agents can experience potential 
hypocritical behaviour with their peers. Within a generation, this considers the number of times a fused indi-
vidual i ( fi > 0 ) takes actions (i.e., makes donations) that contribute to group G’s reputation ( n
pos
i  ) or actions 
(i.e., legitimate defections) that leave group G’s reputation unchanged ( nneui  ) as a proportion of the total actions 
that affect group G’s reputation rG . Defining n
neg
i  as the number of actions made by i in reducing G’s reputation 
( rG ) then we define an agent’s group contribution ratio, ctri as:
This additional form of personal reputation for fused agents gives a basis for agent i to consider whether 
another fused agent j is hypocritical in the group context. We assume this occurs when j exhibits the same or 
greater level of fusion as i, but a comparably lower level of contribution to sustaining group G’s reputation, 
specifically:
We assume that the motivation to consider perceived hypocrisy positively correlates with an agent’s identity 
fusion level, since the perception of an in-group deviate is  strengthened101 when the agent’s personal role in the 
identity of that group is high. Therefore an agent i applies hypocrisy detection (Equation (4)) on a potential 
donor j with probability p, where p = fi.
Step (6) - Responding to hypocrites. Behavioural responses to manage cognitive dissonance can take many 
potential  forms79,102,103. Here we apply the most basic response, involving the exclusion of others, or ostracism2,80. 
This effectively provides a “cost-less punishment”81 and its positive effects in sustaining cooperation have been 
well-established51,104–106. Ostracism can be applied at the interaction stage (step 2) which we call type-1, or at the 
reproduction stage (step 4) which we call type-2, or both stages, denoted type-3. Under type-1 ostracism at the 
interaction step, j does not receive a donation from i, irrespective of i’s action rules. Under type-2 ostracism at 
the reproduction step, then j becomes excluded as a candidate to replace i in the next generation. These responses 
correspond to individuals discounting those that are a threat to their own identity due to this being fused with 
that of the group. To understand the sensitivity of fusion upon ostracism, we also invoke a minimum threshold 
T ( 0 < T < 1 ) that an agent’s fusion level must reach ( fi ≥ T ) for any ostracism (type-1, type-2 or type-3) to 
take place. This enables exploration of highly fused sub-groups.
The modelling assumptions in these six steps incorporates possible relevant behaviours that align with drivers 
from identity fusion (see Table 2), and it is possible that many alternatives could be studied. We also note that this 
agent-based modelling approach deviates from traditional methods used in social identity research and high-
lights wider opportunities to study the evolution of individual differences in group attachment. A summary of 
the key parameters is presented in Table 1. Further implementation details are provided in the Methods Section.
Using the six modelling steps, we experiment with the key parameters and features ( Si , ostracism, T, execu-
tion and perception errors, and cost benefit ratio c/b) to understand the conditions under which identity fusion 
( fi ) is potentially established, promoted and sustained across the population of agents who interact through 
indirect reciprocity. All results are the average of five runs, and we apply m = 5000 rounds of the donation game 
per generation, over 50,000 generations, using a c/b ratio of 0.7. Additionally, at the start of each generation, 
mutation is performed on each element of an agent’s action rule at a rate of 1%, and the new fusion level at a rate 
of 1%. These settings are based on previous exploration of the parameter  space53,107 combined with additional 
consideration of the fusion parameter. Throughout we apply a population of 100 agents. This commonly used 
















(4)fj ≥ fi and ctrj < ctri .
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Results
Ostracism in response to vicarious hypocrisy supports the coevolution of identity fusion and 
cooperation. We assume that T = 0 , indicating that all fused agents undertake either type-1, type-2 or 
type-3 ostracism. The baseline for comparison is the condition where no exclusions are made (i.e., type-0 ostra-
cism). Here, it is known that when identity is represented by individual isolated reputation (i.e., fi = 0 , ∀i ), then 
cooperation readily  emerges53. Fusion disrupts this by providing opportunities for shirkers (i.e., agents with the 
defective strategy) to gain payoff while using the shared group reputation. The average result for the baseline sce-
nario (Figs. 1 and 2) mask a cyclical phenomena where cooperation and fusion co-evolve until shirkers infiltrate 
the population, and both cooperation and fusion collapse.
Under type-1 ostracism, exclusion from donation impedes the payoff for individuals with strategies that 
are potentially inconsistent in supporting group reputation rG . In contrast, type-2 ostracism functions without 
disruption to the donation game, but restricts the propagation of candidate strategies from fused agents that are 
deemed detrimental to sustaining the reputation of G. This means that type-1, type-2 and type-3 ostracism pro-
vide a defence against exploitation of shared group identity, albeit with different levels of effectiveness, dependent 
on the conditions for in-group interaction ( Si ). Figure 1 shows that Si has considerably different effects on average 
cooperation, depending on the form of ostracism that is applied. Without ostracism (type-0, Fig. 1a), externally 
fixing Si , or assuming Si aligns with fusion level (i.e., Si = fi ) equally caps average cooperation to low levels, and 
fusion levels are negligible (type-0, Fig. 2a) as they present a mechanism for defective strategies to take hold.
However type-1 and type-2 ostracism (Fig. 1b,c) reflect that when the higher fused are increasingly more 
likely to interact in-group (i.e., Si = fi ), then islands of cooperation form within the highly fused groups. Type-1 
ostracism introduces discrimination at the interaction stage that dis-incentivises defective behaviour towards 
fused agents. This allows donations to be received from highly fused individuals and in turn incentivises fusion 
Table 2.  Interpretation of the model’s key parameters.
Parameter(s) Theoretical/empirical justification
rj
Reputation rj for an agent j indicates how others may perceive j’s overall identity taking into account j’s fusion with the 
group G. Individual reputations have been widely accepted as providing an explanation for different forms of collective 
 action49, based on agent identities being independent (i.e., mutually exclusive). To generalise this we let rj incorporate 
identity  fusion2, involving an individual’s isolated personal identity overlapping with that of a group through its fusion 
level (fj) . This was originally conceived for human assessment of identity  fusion54, and is based on the subject intersect-
ing circles representing their personal identity and the group’s identity. The extent of intersection of these circles has been 
found to strongly correlate with the subject’s identity fusion fj17, leaving a proportion of 1− fj of j’s personal identity that is 
excluded from overlap with group G’s identity on the Venn diagram. We use this representation as a first proxy to represent 
an integrated identity for j, based on reputations aligned with personal identity (rj) and group identity (rG) , to derive j’s 
integrated reputation rj , where rj = (1− fj)rj + fjrG . Conservatively, we assume this occurs only when the donor is itself 
fused (i.e., fi > 0 ) and therefore can place value in the group’s reputation. Otherwise i perceives j’s reputation rj as rj = rj . 
This ensures that when i is unfused (fi = 0) its behaviour defaults to a base  model53 for indirect reciprocity involving only 
individual isolated reputations. This guards against inadvertently promoting fusion during the agent interaction stage based 
on implicit assumptions of agent awareness of group G
si , ui , di
These binary variables define the current strategy for agent i’s decision-making in the donation game, and are based on 
the social comparison of the potential recipient’s reputation with that of the donor, i. Without consideration of identity 
fusion, the strategy of donating to those with a similar or greater reputation is known to evolve and sustain cooperation 
(i.e., si = ui = 1, di = 0)53. Originating from  Festinger55,56, it is evident that self-referential evaluation frequently influences 
decision making from a social  perspective57–59. Social comparison is also phylogenetically  ancient60 and embedded in 
evaluating competitors and assessing whether or not to commit resources in wide ranging  contexts61–68. These variables are 
subject to evolution and coevolve with an agent’s identity fusion fi.
Si
The in-group for an agent i, is defined as those with at least the same level of identity fusion as i, or greater. The in-group 
is introduced to accommodate possible effects concerning  homophily28,69, allowing an agent to preference interaction with 
others that have a common social identification (i.e., at least the same level of identity fusion). Si controls the probability of 
i playing the donation game with a randomly selected partner j from the in-group during step (1) of the model, as opposed 
to j being randomly selected from the whole population with probability 1− Si . Homophily is known to establish itself 
through evolutionary  means25,28,70,71 and here we control Si exogenously, using a range of values including Si = 0 . While we 
are not aware of research establishing that fusion heightens the probability of in-group interaction, we accommodate this 
possibility by also considering the hypothetical case that Si = fi.
ctri
This represents an additional form of personal reputation for fused agents, noting that under identity fusion, personal 
identity remains salient for fused agents. This assesses the relative contribution (proportion of actions from a generation’s 
start) that an agent is making in support of group G, thus reflecting their in-group behaviour. It enables fused agents, who 
are assumed to have heightened sensitivity to pro-group behaviours, to observe the contribution of other fused agents. 
This leaves agents open to experiencing inconsistencies, relative to themselves, concerning support for G. Through a 
‘visceral sense of oneness’21,54,72,73 with G, we assume a highly fused agent i may experience vicarious  hypocrisy74 when a 
higher fused agent j is observed contributing less support to G than i (i.e., ctri > ctrj ). We assume this invokes cognitive 
 dissonance75–77 for i, which is received through a group connection with j due to fusion with G78,79. In response, agent i is 
assumed to invoke a form of  ostracism2,80, because this is the lowest cost  mitigation81 that an agent can make to reduce its 
dissonance. This aligns with a heightened disposition to maximise in-group  advantage82 despite the additional overhead to 
agent i.
p
p controls the probability that an agent checks the extent that another agent’s contribution towards G (i.e., agent i compares 
ctri against a given agent j’s contribution ctrj ) is justifiable, again based on self-referential social  comparison55,56. We assume 
p = fi , which aligns with an agent having a heightened incentive to consider the pro-group behaviour of other agents when 
its own fusion level is  greater82. This assumption results in an increased chance of checking as fusion increases and reflects 
an increasing pro-group motivation due to an agent’s increased oneness with the group G21,54,72,73. This also ensures that the 
personal identity of fused agents remains salient as their fusion increases.
T
Checking the contribution of other agents incurs an overhead for the agent involved and is more relevant to those with 
greater dependency on fusion towards the group for their own identity. T defines a threshold when agent interest in check-
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(Fig. 2b,c), creating a dependency where cooperation and fusion can coevolve. When Si = fi , payoff from coop-
erative actions of fused individuals are more likely to remain between fused individuals, meaning that selection, 
when combined with type-2 ostracism, impedes fused individuals from adopting strategies that conflict with 
their dependency on the group identity. This provides an advantage to fused agents who receive payoff benefits 
from the cooperative and fused. Note that this dynamic does not establish itself when the probability of in-group 
interaction is fixed rather than being correlated with fusion (i.e., Si = fi).
Responding to hypocrisy at both interaction and reproduction reduces sensitivity to the 
extent of in‑group interactions. Interestingly, when type-1 and type-2 are combined there appears to be 
a compound effect occurring (type-3, Figs. 1d, 2d), that is sufficient to promote cooperation when the popula-
tion mixing structure is exogenously fixed throughout, across a wide span of Si values. While type-1 and type-2 
ostracism show significant variation in response to in-group interaction, this is not the case for type-3, with aver-
Figure 1.  Average cooperation per generation for type 1 (b), 2 (c) or 3 (d) ostracism. Type 0 (a) represents a 
scenario without ostracism. Ostracism is performed by each agent i with a probability equal to the agent’s fusion 
level fi . Average cooperation indicates the cumulative frequency of cooperative interactions, defined as the total 
number of donations made in all preceding generations as a proportion of the total number of games played in 
all preceding generations. Agents interact randomly with the other fused individuals within their in-group with 
fixed probabilities of Si ( Si = 0.1, 0.5, 0.9 ), or with a probability equal to their own current fusion level ( Si = fi ). 
Sglobal indicates that all agents mix uniform randomly (i.e., Si = 0 ). The in-group of an agent i is defined as 
the subset of agents having at least same level of fusion as i (i.e., fi or greater). Agents interact randomly with 
the whole population with a probability equal to 1− Si . Results are averaged over five randomly seeded runs. 
Number of agents N = 100 ; number of games per generation m = 5000 ; number of generations M = 50, 000 . 
Action rules and fusion levels are mutated at the rate of 0.01 per generation.
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age cooperation and average fusion both achieving greater than 85%. In contrast high sensitivity to the structure 
of interactions (i.e., the extent of in-group interactions) affects type-1 and type-2 ostracism, for both average 
cooperation and average fusion (Figs. 1b,c, 2b,c). These sensitivities can be seen in Fig. 3, where the spread of 
performance in both dimensions is an approximate linear function of in-group mixing ( Si ). The results affirm 
that the action of ostracism, motivated by hypocrisy, is a highly effective strategy for incentivising a shared group 
identity that aligns with cooperation. However this needs to take place at multiple points in an agent’s activity 
(i.e., both interaction and reproduction) to be robust to in-group mixing when this is exogenously controlled by 
the scenario (i.e., Si fixed).
The response of only the highly fused individuals to hypocrisy is sufficient to invoke popula‑
tion‑wide fusion. Figure 4 shows that if ostracism is invoked by only the most highly fused, then it is suffi-
cient for both cooperation and fusion to coevolve. This indicates that those with the greatest fusion levels can act, 
through discrimination towards hypocrisy, to protect the group reputation on which they are highly dependent. 
Figure 2.  Average fusion per generation for type 1 (b), 2 (c) or 3 (d) ostracism. Type 0 (a) represents a scenario 
without ostracism. Ostracism is performed by each agent i with a probability equal to the agent’s fusion level fi . 
Average fusion is the sum of all occurrences of fusion levels seen up to and including the current generation, 
divided by the number of generation-agent pairs (the number of generation-agent pairs is the current generation 
number multiplied by the number of agents). Agents interact randomly with the other fused individuals within 
their in-group with fixed probabilities of Si ( Si = 0.1, 0.5, 0.9 ), or with a probability equal to their own current 
fusion level ( Si = fi ). Sglobal indicates that all agents mix uniform randomly (i.e., Si = 0 ). The in-group of an 
agent i is defined as the subset of agents having at least same level of fusion as i (i.e., fi or greater). Agents 
interact randomly with the whole population with a probability equal to 1− Si . Results are averaged over five 
randomly seeded runs. Parameter settings are consistent with Fig. 1.
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Figure 3.  Average cooperation as a function of the average level of fusion for type 0, 1, 2 and 3 ostracism, 
denoted t0, t1, t2 and t3 respectively. Ostracism is performed by each agent i with a probability equal to the agent’s 
fusion level fi . Each data point is referenced by different probabilities of in-group interactions Si , which indicates 
the probability that an agent i interacts with a randomly chosen member of the in-group. The in-group of an 
agent i is defined as the subset of agents having at least same level of fusion as i (i.e., fi or greater). Si is defined as 
either a fixed probability within the range [0,1] or correlated with the agent’s fusion level (e.g., Si = fi ). Agents 
interact randomly with the whole population with a probability equal to 1 - Si . Results are averaged over five 
randomly seeded runs, each conducted for 50,000 generations. Parameter settings are consistent with Fig. 1.
Figure 4.  Average cooperation as a function of the average level of fusion for type 1, 2 and 3 ostracism. 
Ostracism is performed by each agent i with a probability equal to the agent’s fusion level fi . Each data point 
is referenced by different probabilities of a threshold T defined as the minimum threshold that an agent’s 
fusion must reach in order for ostracism to take place ( fi ≥ T ). T is defined as a threshold value within the 
range [0,1] fixed for each of the agents. Agents interact randomly with the other fused individuals within their 
in-group with a probability equal to their own fusion levels ( Si = fi ). The in-group of an agent i is defined as the 
subset of agents having at least same level of fusion as i (i.e., fi or greater). Agents interact randomly with the 
whole population with a probability equal to 1 − Si . Results are averaged over five randomly seeded runs, each 
conducted for 50,000 generations. Parameter settings are consistent with Fig. 1.
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Collectively this provides fused agents with an advantage where fusion becomes aligned with payoff, leading 
to promotion and escalation of the fused population. These observations assume that agents interact more fre-
quently with other fused individuals based on their own fusion levels ( Si = fi ), and the results apply strongly for 
type-3 ostracism, but less so for type-2 ostracism, and not for type-1 ostracism in isolation.
These results also emphasise that only a subpopulation needs to be compliant in terms of adherence to detec-
tion and response to hypocrisy, and this sub-population aligns with those agents that naturally have the greatest 
motivation to act in this way due to the nature of identity fusion. Note that additionally, the behaviour of the 
subgroup results in the wider population being incentivised to diminish the isolated (i.e., non-group) element 
of personal reputation, through fusion towards the group.
Coevolution of fusion and cooperation is robust to perception and execution errors on hypoc‑
risy. To assess resilience, we consider the effect of errors upon an agent’s interpretation of exclusion in 
response to hypocrisy [Eq. (4)], and we assess the subsequent effects assuming type-1, type-2 and type-3 ostra-
cism. Perception error corresponds to mis-information, where perception of an individual’s contribution to 
the group is replaced by a random number in the range [0, 1]. Execution error causes an agent to incorrectly 
respond to hypocrisy, by not performing ostracism when it should. These errors are governed by probabilities 
ep and ex respectively. Figure 5 shows that significantly different effects are caused by these alternative forms of 
error. However in both cases, at least 20% error can be tolerated under type-3 ostracism, while sustaining strong 
average cooperation and strong average fusion levels, reaching over 80% in both cases.
The more execution error ex is applied under any type of ostracism, the closer the model gets to the default 
of functioning without ostracism (type-0). Type-1 ostracism exhibits slightly more sensitivity to execution error 
(i.e., up to ex = 0.2 ) after which the behaviour of type-1 and type-2 converge towards 0.4 for both average coop-
eration and average fusion. In combination, execution error in type-3 ostracism provides an additional layer 
of protection over execution error in type-1 ostracism, by ensuring that error in payoff accumulated through 
mis-execution has less chance of being compounded by ostracism at the reproduction step. This leads to robust 
performance: a 40% execution error rate under type-3 ostracism results in average cooperation and average 
fusion levels greater than 0.7.
In contrast to this, perception errors function by injecting noise in the signal on which the decision to perform 
ostracism is based, rather than using authentic information and failing to execute ostracism. As perception error 
increases, type-1 and type-2 ostracism result in average cooperation and average fusion behaving in a similar 
way, diminishing to a plateau in terms of average cooperation. However type-3 ostracism behaves significantly 
differently, which appears counter-intuitive on first sight. In particular, when perception error is more frequent 
( ep ≥ 0.5 ), average cooperation increases. However, this correlates with a decrease in fusion, and this signals 
that the compound effect of noise in ostracism at the interaction and selection stages combine to limit fusion 
taking hold. This in turn limits defective strategies from taking hold through reputation sharing and allows 
cooperative strategies to dominate, consistent with all agents having only a personal reputation and no  fusion53. 
Note that these experiments are performed without errors being applied to the action rules, which govern the 
extent of cooperative behaviour.
Identity fusion coevolves with cooperation in the presence of associated marginal increases 
in cost. While ostracism is regarded as a “cost-less punishment”81, those that invoke hypocrisy may incur an 
additional relative cost due to the overhead in collecting more information about other agents. Although this is 
a debatable issue (fused individuals may feel incentivised based on their shared identity with the group or may 
acquire information implicitly through cost-neutral social mechanisms such as gossiping), we consider a mar-
ginal cost for agents potentially instigating ostracism, as compared to those who function without (i.e., assuming 
type-0 ostracism).
Using threshold T, we introduce an additional cost cT for agents that invoke potential ostracism. Agents with 
fusion levels of at least T incur a cost of c + cT for each donation, where agents with a fusion level below T (i.e., 
don’t invoke potential ostracism) incur a cost c for a donation. Figure 6 shows the effect upon allowing cT to range 
between 5% and 30% of c, applying c = 0.7 . The results show that the additional marginal cost has little impact 
on the evolution of cooperation and fusion, when cT is up to a level of around 15%.
Beyond cT = 0.15 , the additional cost represents a barrier to high fusion levels and cooperation. The disrup-
tive effect of the differential cost on fusion and cooperation is interesting - note that when all agents incur a 
uniform cost c + cT for donation (i.e., T = 0 ), average fusion and average cooperation is greater than when using 
the dual cost structure (i.e., cost c + cT only above threshold T where T > 0 ). Agents are effectively trading a 
cost advantage against adopting a fusion level of T or beyond, and cT = 15% is the approximate level at which 
additional costs impede this transition.
Discussion
The results provide insight into how identity fusion is promoted alongside cooperation in support of a group. 
Consistent with the qualitative development of identity  fusion1, an agent centric approach is modelled where 
the group is a passive entity that holds a reputation but no agency in is own right. Thus agents retain personal 
empowerment and have the autonomy to change their fusion level, which governs the extent to which an indi-
vidual’s own identity is drawn from the group. This is represented by the fused agent’s personal embodiment of 
the group’s reputation. Natural selection is invoked to observe the evolution of agents’ fusion levels, alongside 
the agents strategy for cooperation, which is based on the social comparison of other agent’s reputation.
The saliency of fused agents’ personal identity is reflected through a form of in-group reputation, expressing 
their contribution towards the group. Vicarious hypocrisy is central to assessing this form of reputation between 
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agents, the sensitivity to which heightens through identity fusion towards the group. This captures inconsistent 
behaviour from the perspective of a fused agent, concerning support for the group’s reputation given the extent 
of the agents’ fusion. When fusion is strong, vicarious dissonance indicates a threat to the individual agent, 
triggering cognitive dissonance and motivating a behavioural response to reconcile this effect - our results 
indicate that ostracism at both interaction and selection is preferential. Through this mechanism, the group 
implicitly benefits from the action of fused agents. This is also sustained when there is a modest cost differential 
associated with the ‘punishment overhead’ (up to around 15% additional cost). Consequently, fusion provides 
a coordination mechanism for collective action, where personal incentives drive a benefit that is shared across 
other fused individuals. A strong incentive for fused individuals to sustain their contribution towards the group 
is inherent, otherwise agents become vulnerable to being perceived as hypocrites themselves, resulting in ostra-
cism diminishing their payoff and future selection opportunities. This drives the evolution of fusion, with fused 
agents effectively gaining an advantage from the support of fused others, against shirkers.
The coordination mechanism for ostracism, invoked through identity fusion towards a group, is particularly 
noteworthy. From the perspective of human cooperation, altruistic punishment of shirking behaviour in humans 
has been acknowledged as key in promoting indirect  reciprocity109, particularly in the context of a group, which 
Figure 5.  Average cooperation (a) and fusion (b) as a function of the rate of execution error ex . Average 
cooperation (c) and fusion (d) as a function of the rate of perception error ep . Ostracism of type 1, 2, or 3 is 
performed by each agent i with a probability equal to the agent’s fusion level fi . Perception error ep is defined as 
the probability of the individual’s contribution to the group being replaced by a random number in the range 
[0,1]. Execution error ex is defined as the probability for an agent not to perform ostracism when it should. 
Agents interact randomly with the other fused individuals within their in-group with a probability equal to their 
own fusion levels ( Si = fi ). The in-group of an agent i is defined as the subset of agents having at least same level 
of fusion as i (i.e., fi or greater). Agents interact randomly with the whole population with a probability equal to 
1 − Si . Results are averaged over five randomly seeded runs, each conducted for 50,000 generations. Parameter 
settings are consistent with Fig. 1.
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is central to the organisation and success of human cooperation. Such punishment represents collective  action110, 
where individuals undertake a potentially costly individual action that benefits the wider group and introduces a 
second-order free rider problem. However it has remained a longstanding puzzle as to how such collective action 
 arises83, with a variety of alternative mechanisms proposed without consensus. A significant number of proposals 
align with human psychological capabilities, such as an individual becoming culturally conditioned by social 
 norms111–113, neural satisfaction from punishing norm  violation114,115,  egalitarianism116,  morality117 or influence 
due to negative  emotions109. However, the belief system that underpin these dispositions is likely to occur as the 
consequence of an individual’s identity, including their psychological interdependence with their in-group118. 
Noting that this can be expressed through identity  fusion119, and based on our model that demonstrates how 
identity fusion can transfer group objectives to the individual, we hypothesise that identity fusion unifies the 
explanation of how collective action enables the resourcing and coordination of seemingly altruistic punishment.
An important point to note however, is that our findings are based on fusion evolving entirely from dyadic 
encounters rather than from multimodal encounters, which is arguably more realistic. Different dynamics may 
result under such conditions. Furthermore, perception of in-group violations in our model assume public knowl-
edge. In practice this may well not be the  case120 and its important to consider the consequences of identity 
fusion not being globally visible. Our results on execution and perception errors provide some initial insights 
in this direction, indicating that reasonable level of obfuscation can be sustained (e.g., 40% execution error rate 
under type-3 ostracism) while allowing fusion and cooperation to evolve. However this may change considerably 
when observations are to some degree private, and individual agents may be positioned to make different private 
observations. Investigation of such a scenario may benefit from using a social network to structure the agents, 
which also allows hetrogeneous relationships between individuals to come into play.
The evolution of identity fusion through our model also provides a new perspective on group or multi-level 
selection. This is a longstanding issue of considerable debate, where it is proposed that selection can act on 
groups as well as their constituent members.  Pinker121 strongly argues that this is an illusion, with no plausible 
mechanism for a ‘group gene’ facilitating selection. It is argued that this illusion exists as a consequence of the 
power, influence and manipulation exercised by a group over its members (e.g., through monotheistic religions).
However, our model of reputation, based on identity fusion towards a  group7, provides an explanation as to 
how group level selection may appear to be a phenomenon in its own right, while actually its the individuals that 
are fused with the group’s identity that give the basis for selection. Because identity fusion enables individuals 
to take a degree of the group identity as their own, and the group benefits (e.g., high reputation) are felt by the 
single individual, the group is providing utility and advantage that can be propagated to individuals in future 
generations. Our model demonstrates that this requires individuals to increasingly influence the contribution 
of others towards the group as they become increasingly fused, which is plausible because individuals become 
more dependent on the group’s reputation under these circumstances. Detecting hypocrisy is therefore individu-
ally incentivised, but the benefits spread to the group. In this way, fused individuals can gain an evolutionary 
advantage, that helps to explain at least partially, why a notion of group-level evolution may appear to present 
Figure 6.  Average cooperation (a) and fusion (b) as a function of the cost threshold T and for different rates of 
the additional cost cT . Ostracism of type 3 is performed by each agent i with a probability equal to the agent’s 
fusion level fi . Threshold T defined as the minimum threshold that an agent’s fusion must reach ( fi ≥ T ) in 
order for ostracism to take place. Agents with a fusion level equal or below T incur a cost c = 0.7 for a donation 
while agents with fusion levels above T incur a cost of c + cT for each donation. cT is defined in a range between 
5% and 30% of c. Agents interact randomly with the other fused individuals within their in-group with a 
probability equal to their own fusion levels ( Si = fi ). The in-group of an agent i is defined as the subset of agents 
having at least same level of fusion as i (i.e., fi or greater). Agents interact randomly with the whole population 
with a probability equal to 1 − Si . Results are averaged over five randomly seeded runs, each conducted for 
50,000 generations. Parameter settings are consistent with Fig. 1.
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itself as a selection mechanism. This also highlights that hypocrisy, as an instinctive human state, may have been 
realised as a mechanism to provide advantage to those engaging in identity fusion.
Representing our model in a computational form has enabled observation of important dynamics that are 
sufficient to promote the evolution of identity fusion in digital agents, while also sustaining cooperation. These 
dynamics embody simple representations of human behaviour and give clues as to their possible ecological 
importance, indicating new directions for experimental validation in a human context. One such avenue is the 
role of hypocrisy with respect to group identity, which has not been central in the original conceptualisation of 
identity fusion but, we argue, represents a novel and straightforward response behaviour that is likely invoked 
through heightened fusion. As fused individuals are motivated to act in support of the group, it is plausible that 
they would also expect such behaviour in other group members, with heightened sensitivity to group members 
who, despite their group membership, do not act in the group’s interests. Such sensitivity to hypocrisy is finely 
tuned in humans and can be understood, in part, as a form of false  signalling122. Furthermore, observers tend 
to be quite sensitive to violations of norms of in-group  loyalty123, suggesting that such processes would be even 
more powerful in highly fused individuals. Thus, an empirical approach could assess the relationship between 
identity fusion and sensitivity to the behaviour of other individuals towards the group. For example, are highly 
fused individuals more sensitive to the group-related behaviour of others? Are they more likely to ostracise of 
otherwise impose costs on group members who fail to act in the group’s interests? Answering these questions 
via experimental research would be a valuable way to align model predictions with human behaviour. Such 
experiments would involve observing how participants, expressing a range of fusion levels towards a particular 
group, respond to the potentially hypocritical actions of others. Existing  approaches122,123 provide useful experi-
mental designs that could be further augmented to consider identity fusion, where data can be collected online 
or through in-lab participation.
Additionally, we note that how identity fusion affects choices for interaction between individuals is an interest-
ing direction for empirical research that is stimulated by this work. For example, it would be useful to examine 
whether individual-level fusion increases the tendency to preferentially interact with other in-group members, 
as optionally considered in our model; while the tendency to prefer in-group partners in general has been 
previously  observed124, this has not yet been explicitly linked to identity fusion per se, and would contribute 
further insights concerning homophily and identity. Finally, the model also highlights opportunities to explore 
how fused individuals might consider their reputation as contingent on the group’s reputation. Arguments on 
how groups are used to define one’s social  self125 are relevant here, in particular how individuals perceive they 
are evaluated given the groups to which they belong. These questions would also be readily open to exploration 
through experimentation or observation.
Methods
We consider the evolution of indirect reciprocity based on the donation game, a special case of the mutual aid 
 game83 assuming a single donor. We extend the social comparison of  reputation53 to consider the evolution of 
identity fusion of agents towards a group G. An agent’s identity fusion is modelled through its composition 
of reputation (see Reputation Section) and the extent to which it draws on the group’s reputation. Agents are 
randomly selected to play the donation game. Two components affect how this is conducted - firstly the agent’s 
action rules (see Action Rules Section), and secondly the agent’s fusion level, which may lead the agent to con-
sidering their in-group standing and the potential hypocrisy of the other player (see Section on Personal Identity 
of Fused Agents and Hypocrisy). The donor’s reputation is updated (see Assessment Rules Section). After 5000 
donation games, which constitutes one generation, natural selection is performed (see Selection and Reproduc-
tion Section). This cycle is repeated for 50,000 generations. Initial action rules and fusion levels are randomly 
assigned and results represent the average of 5 randomly seeded runs. Key variables are summarised in Figure 1.
Reputation. An agent i’s fusion level fi towards group G determines the extent that its reputation ri is com-
posed of the group’s reputation rG . Specifically i’s integrated reputation is ri = (1− fi)ri + firG where ri indicates 
the agent i’s personal reputation, consistent with the Venn diagram overlap approach through which human 
subjects express the extent of their identity fusion towards a  group54. ri and rG are represented as integers and are 
capped in the range [-5,5]53. However, whether or not agent i has non-zero fusion towards G affects how i views 
j’s reputation. When fi = 0 , we assume that i is not positioned to value the group reputation rG and therefore 
i views only j’s isolated personal reputation (i.e., i assumes rj = rj ) irrespective of j’s fusion level. When fi > 0 , 
then i views j’s reputation taking into account the extent of j’s fusion level (i.e., i assumes rj = (1− fj)rj + fjrG).
Personal identity of fused agents and hypocrisy. Within each generation, an agent’s contribution to 













 , where: nposi  is the number of actions made by i that result 
in an increase to rG ; nneui  is the number of actions made by i (legitimate defections) that don’t invoke a change to 
rG ; n
neg
i  is the number of actions made by i that reduce rG . ctri is set to zero at the beginning of each generation. 
ctri represents an additional form of personal reputation for fused agents through which their individuality can 
be assessed. A fused agent i ( fi > 0 ) views another fused agent j ( fj > 0 ) as a hypocrite if and only if both 
fj ≥ fi and ctrj < ctri.
Hypocrite detection is used by agent i to determine whether or not a form of ostracism is performed against j. 
We also invoke a minimum threshold T, (0 < T < 1) that an agent’s fusion level must reach for any ostracism to 
take place. When fi ≥ T , then either type-1, type-2 or type-3 ostracism is invoked with probability p = fi . Under 
type-1 ostracism, i ignores its action rules (see Action Rule Section) and does not undertake a donation towards 
j. This may result in a penalty for its personal reputation ri . Under type-2 ostracism, i excludes j at reproduction 
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(see Reproduction Section). Under type-3 ostracism i invokes both type-1 and type-2 ostracism. type-0 is used 
to indicate that no ostracism is undertaken.
Action rules. In each generation we perform 5000 random agent selections where each selected agent i plays 
the donation game. The probability that i plays against a randomly selected member of i’s in-group (i.e., i and 
j have at least fi fusion in common) is Si . Either Si is exogenously fixed or Si = fi . When Si = 0 j is randomly 
selected from the whole population. If type-1 ostracism is invoked and i ostracises j, then i makes no donation 
to j irrespective of its action rules. Otherwise i considers its action rules, as defined by the binary variables ui , 
di and si . These determine whether or not i donates when similarity (si) , upward comparison (ui) or downward 
comparison (di) is observed by i in respect of the potential recipient j’s reputation ( rj ), as compared to i’s reputa-
tion ( ri ). Similarity occurs when rj − ≤ ri ≤ rj + , upward self-comparison occurs when rj > ri +� , and 
downward self-comparison occurs when rj < ri −� . We set  = 0 . If i donates to j then i incurs a cost c + cT 
and j receives a benefit b, and we apply a cost to benefit ratio of c = 0.7 and b = 1 . cT represents a potential 
additional cost due to detecting hypocrisy, and is set as cT = 0 unless otherwise stated. An agent’s payoff for a 
particular generation represents the total payoff less total costs that are incurred from participation in donation 
games. Payoff is set to zero at the beginning of each generation.
Assessment. Personal ( ri ) and group ( rG ) reputations are updated in response to an agent’s donation behav-
iour, based on the whether i is fused. The principle of  standing88,93,94 is applied. If i donates to j then both ri and 
rG are incremented. If i defects on j and j is at least as reputable as i ( rj ≥ ri ) then both ri and rG are decremented. 
If i defects on j and j is less reputable than i ( rj < ri ) both ri and rG remain unchanged. These rules assume that 
i is fused ( fi > 0 ) and is therefore dependent on both ri and rG . When fi = 0 the above updating rules are only 
applied to ri . These updating rules apply in response to donation decisions made using the action rules. If i 
defects on j due to type-1 ostracism, then ri is decremented if and only if rj ≥ ri and no penalty to rG occurs since 
from the perspective of G, the defection is legitimate.
Selection and reproduction. At the end of each generation we apply clonal reproduction, which is 
dependent on a single parent being replaced by an agent selected from the current population. This is commonly 
used in previous studies on the evolution of indirect  reciprocity42,44,96,97. Payoff is applied as the fitness func-
tion, and if type-2 ostracism is invoked then an agent i excludes from consideration any agent j that it views as 
hypocritical (see Hypocrisy Section). When an agent k is selected, its action rule and fusion level is copied and 
carried forward to create an offspring agent in the new generation. This process is repeated for all agents i in the 
current generation. For each agent k in the new generation, sk , uk , dk and fk are each randomly mutated at the 
rate of µ = 1/100 . Payoff and all reputation variables are set to zero in preparation for the next generation to 
commence.
Perception and execution errors. Perception error ( ep ) corresponds to mis-information, where percep-
tion of an individual’s contribution ( ctrj ) to the group is replaced by a random number in the range [0, 1]. Execu-
tion error ( ex ) causes an agent to incorrectly respond to hypocrisy, by not performing ostracism when it should, 
as defined in the Hypocrisy Section above. These can be to applied to type-1, type-2 and type-3 ostracism. 
Results indicate when these are optionally applied.
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